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The Future Of The "Wrongful Birth"
Cause Of Action
I. Introduction
"Genetic defects represent an increasingly large part of the
national health care burden .... Control of genetic disease may
be achieved only by preventing the birth of [afflicted children,
because] there is no effective treatment."1 The tort of "wrongful
birth 2 establishes a doctor's duty to inform prospective parents
of genetic defects, and aids in achieving the goal of preventing
these births.3 The tort imposes liability on a defendant physi-
cian for damages and expenses incurred by the parents when,
but for his failure to inform them of the genetic defects in the
fetus, they would have terminated the pregnancy.4 The theory of
liability is that the physician's negligence precluded the parents
from making an informed decision about whether to bear a ge-
netically diseased child.5
This relatively new tort is predicated on a woman's consti-
tutional right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."
1. Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE LJ. 1488, 1496-97 (1978).
2. For definition of this term, see infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
3. See Note, supra note 1, at 1495.
4. Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action - Suggestions
for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 611, 621 (1980).
5. Martha C. Romney & Dorothy Duffy, Medicine and Law: Recent Developments,
25 TORT & INs. L.J. 351, 355 (1990).
6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, a woman's constitutional right to
an abortion is not absolute. Rather, it is governed by the trimester approach set forth by
the Court:
In the first trimester of pregnancy, "the attending physician, in consultation with
his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medi-
cal judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is
reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by
the State." Id. at 163.
In the second trimester, "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the ex-
tent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health." Id.
In the third trimester, "if the State is interested in protecting fetal life after via-
1
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Prior to Roe v. Wade,, parents could not sustain causes of action
for wrongful birth injuries for two reasons. First, they could not
claim that the physician's failure to inform caused the birth de-
fect and, second, they could not obtain legal eugenic abortions 8
in most states.0 Roe established that "[p]ublic policy now sup-
ports, rather than militates against, the proposition that [a wo-
man shall] not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportu-
nity to [the abortion] decision." 10 Thus, Roe provided the
missing element of "proximate cause"" in wrongful birth ac-
tions: the showing that a pregnancy can be lawfully terminated
is "essential for [establishing] a causal connection between de-
fendant's failure to inform and plaintiffs' damages."12
The United States Supreme Court's most recent abortion
decision in Rust v. Sullivan,1 however, threatens the continued
recognition of wrongful birth actions. In Rust, the Court upheld
federal regulations 14 that interpret Title X of the Public Health
Service Act' 5 and that provide federal funding for family plan-
ning services. As a result, the Court held that physicians may
not counsel, refer, or provide information regarding abortion as
a method of family planning to Title X recipients. 6 Although
the Court emphasized that the federal regulations only prohibit
abortion related activity connected with Title X projects, 17
bility, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
Eugenics is the science which addresses itself to improving the stock, whether
human or animal; to means and methods of improving the physical and mental
qualities of future generations by control of mating and reproduction ...
[E]ugenic abortion would be one based on the probability or possibility that the
fetus may be born in a mentally or physically abnormal condition.
Id. at 701; see also Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975)(wherein the court
commented that eugenic abortion prevents the birth of a defective child).
9. See Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 695-703 (N.J. 1967) (Francis, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the background of abortion in detail).
10. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
11. See infra note 26 for a discussion of proximate cause.
12. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848.
13. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
14. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1 - 59.10 (1991).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. (1991).
16. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
17. Id. at 1775.
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Rust's implications are far-reaching. Arguably, in the context of
public funding, a physician will refrain from his duty to inform a
woman of the probability of her fetus being genetically defec-
tive, because it may be viewed as advocating abortion.
Part II of this Comment will trace the development of the
wrongful birth tort, emphasizing that its recognition has been
premised on the physician's duty to inform, and the woman's
constitutional right to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy. Part III will discuss the United States Supreme Court's
abortion decisions after Roe demonstrating that these decisions,
culminating in Rust, have rendered a woman's constitutional
right nugatory, and have threatened sustainable wrongful birth
actions. A proposed Model Statute, with Annotations and Com-
mentary that incorporate these decisions, is appended to this
Comment.
This Comment concludes that Title X patients, like other
patients, have a "liberty interest in being free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion in the informed consent dialogue neces-
sary to medical self-determination."18 The common law duty to
disclose material information has been applied historically in the
doctor-patient context, and adopted by nearly every state as a
basis for civil liability.19 Rust confines Title X physicians in an
"undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of
[their] profession."2 0 Moreover, Rust signals to the states that
they may now relieve doctors of their duty to inform in the con-
text of public funding, while technically leaving the woman's
constitutional right to an abortion unfettered.21 As a result, the
recognition of wrongful birth actions "[m]ay go full circle. '22
States may return to policies of promoting childbirth over abor-
tion by relieving these doctors of the duty to inform, thus cir-
cumventing the constitutional right to abort.23
18. REPLY BRmF FOR PmErmomns, RusT, at 15, Rust v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d
Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1391), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
19. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens,
JJ.).
20. Id. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (quot-
ing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
21. Id. at 1777.
22. See Romney, supra note 5, at 362.
23. Id. Courts may return to the rationale of Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689
(N.J. 1967). Gleitman is the seminal case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
1992]
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H. The "Wrongful Birth" Cause of Action
A. Distinguishing "Wrongful Birth," "Wrongful Life,"
"Wrongful Pregnancy," and "Wrongful Conception."
"Wrongful birth" is an action brought by parents "[a]gainst
a physician [who] failed to inform [them] of the increased possi-
bility that the mother would give birth to a child suffering from
birth defects . . [,thereby precluding] an informed decision
about whether [to have borne] the child." ' In such cases, the
parents allege they would have aborted had the physician
"[p]roperly advised [them] of the risk of birth defects to the po-
tential child."2 5 They seek "[r]ecovery for their expenses in car-
ing for the deformed child, and for their own pain and
suffering.
'26
"Wrongful life" is the corresponding action brought by the
deformed child to recover damages.2 7 "An action for 'wrongful
fused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth because it was precluded by the
countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of human life. Id. at 693.
24. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 546 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981) (citation
omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. Plaintiffs' complaints sound essentially in negligence or medical malpractice.
Id. A successful plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a duty, the breach of which
may be considered the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the injured party.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); WLUAM PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 43 (4th ed. 1971). These elements will be addressed briefly.
Duty. "[T]he physician's professional relationship with the woman clearly estab-
lishes a duty of due care." Comment, supra note 4, at 649. Physicians are required to
impart material information to their patients, as to the likelihood of future children be-
ing born defective, to enable them to make an informed decision whether to terminate
the pregnancy. See Note, supra note 1, at 1504-08.
Breach. The breach of duty is the failure to inform prospective parents of the "risk
of fetal defects." Rogers, Thomas DeWitt, II, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medi-
cal Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S. C. L. REv 713, 749
(1982). As such, it is measured by the failure to conform to the appropriate standard of
skill, care, or learning. Id.
Proximate Cause. "IT]he parents' assertion that they would have avoided the defec-
tive child's birth if they had been properly informed is sufficient to establish the 'causal
connection between defendant's failure to inform and plaintiffs' damages'." Id. at 750
(citations omitted).
But see Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) One court has determined
that causation cannot be proven in a wrongful birth case. Id. at 744-45 (quoting Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 418, 386 N.E.2d 807, 815, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 904 (1978)
(Wachtler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
27. Phillips, 508 F. Supp at 545 n.1.
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pregnancy' or 'wrongful conception' is generally brought by the
parents of a healthy, but unwanted, child against a pharmacist
or pharmaceutical manufacturer for negligently filling a contra-
ceptive prescription, or against a physician for negligently per-
forming a sterilization procedure or an abortion. '2 8 The latter
three torts exceed the scope of this Comment.
B. Background and Public Policy Considerations of "Wrong-
ful Birth" Actions
Prior to Roe v. Wade,29 some courts refused to recognize a
cause of action for "wrongful birth," because of public policy
considerations "supporting the preciousness of human life." 30
The seminal case is Gleitman v. Cosgrove.31 Mrs. Gleitman and
her husband brought an action in New Jersey Superior Court
against her doctor for wrongful birth when their child was born
with defects. Mrs. Gleitman had contracted German Measles
early in her pregnancy, and the couple alleged that the doctor
had negligently assured Mrs. Gleitman that her disease would
not affect the fetus.32 The Gleitmans further alleged that they
might have aborted had the doctor informed them of the risk.3
The trial court dismissed the action because abortion was a
criminal offense in New Jersey at the time. 4
On appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal,
but on other grounds.3 5 The court reasoned that "[iln order to
determine [the Gleitmans'] compensatory damages a court
would have to evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, un-
measurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and fa-
therhood and weigh these against the alleged emotional and
money injuries."3' Such an evaluation was impossible in the
court's view.37 Even assuming "[a]n abortion could have been
28. Id.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967).
31. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
32. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 690.
33. Id. at 691.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 693.
36. Id.
37. Id.
1992]
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obtained without making its participants liable to criminal sanc-
tions, substantial policy reasons prevented [the] court from al-
lowing tort damages for the denial of opportunity to take an em-
bryonic life."' 38 The court believed that it was "[b]asic to the
human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heavily
burdened." 39
Despite public policy considerations, not all state courts fol-
lowed New Jersey's refusal to recognize the wrongful birth cause
of action.40 Such courts categorized the causes of action as negli-
gence or medical malpractice. 41 A review of these cases will illus-
trate the progression of this tort in various states.
In the 1975 case of Jacobs v. Theimer, 2 an expectant
mother had contracted rubella. The parents brought an action
alleging that, but for the doctor's failure to diagnose and inform
them of the mother's condition and of its potential effects on
their fetus, they would have terminated the pregnancy.43 Even
though eugenic abortions44 were prohibited in Texas at the time,
the Texas Supreme Court relied on common law negligence in
upholding the Jacobses' claim.45 The court held that the doctor
was duty-bound to make reasonable disclosure of the diagnosis,
as a reasonable doctor would make under the circumstances. 40
Had the Jacobses been fully informed about rubella and its con-
sequences, abortion would have been the only way to have
avoided damages. Therefore, a showing that the pregnancy could
be terminated "[b]y lawful means [was] essential [to establish] a
38. Id.
39. Id. The court continued:
'For the living there is hope, but for the dead there is none.' (citation omitted.)
The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say what defects
should prevent an embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the opportu-
nity to terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can support a cause
for action.
Id.
40. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.,
233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
41. See infra notes 42-104 and accompanying text.
42. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
43. Id. at 847.
44. See supra note 8 for a discussion of eugenic abortion.
45. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848.
46. Id.
(Vol. 12:717
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causal connection between [the doctor's] failure to inform and
the [Jacobses'] damages.' 7
The Jacobs court distinguished Gleitman, in which the par-
ents had sued for all past and future expenses in raising the
child and for their own mental anguish.8 In contrast, the
Jacobses sued only for the economic burden related to the
child's physical defects. The Texas Supreme Court found such
damages reasonable, and awarded them to the parents accord-
ingly.49 Public policy considerations were not compelling enough
to warrant an opposite result.50
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly analyzed the
wrongful birth tort in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital51 that
same year. The facts precipitating this case occurred prior to the
decision in Roe v. Wade.52 The court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether a doctor had a legal duty to inform a mother of
her option to abort absent danger to her health. 3 Responding in
the negative, the court nonetheless ruled that the doctor had
been negligent in failing to diagnose the mother's rubella." The
doctor had a duty to inquire as to whether she was pregnant.5 5 If
the mother was pregnant, the doctor had a duty to "[i]nform her
of the probable effects of rubella on the fetus, including its irre-
versible nature."5 Plaintiffs were successful in proving they
would have sought and submitted to a legal abortion; they were
47. Id.
48. Id. at 849.
49. Id. at 846. The court explained:
These expenses lie within the methods of proof by which courts are accustomed to
determine awards in personal injury cases. No public policy obstacle should be
interposed to that recovery. It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once
deprives the parents of information by which they could elect to terminate the
pregnancy likely to produce a child with defective body, a policy which in effect
requires that the deficient embryo be carried to full gestation until the deficient
child is born, and which policy then denies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of
treating and caring for the defects of the child.
Id. at 849.
50. Id.
51. 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
52. Id. at 377 n.6.
53. Id. at 377.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
1992]
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awarded damages sustained as a result of the child's defects.57
Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals, New
York's highest state court, recognized the wrongful birth tort in
the consolidated cases of Becker v. Schwartz and Park v Ches-
sin.58 In Becker, plaintiffs brought an action against defendant
doctors after plaintiff mother bore a retarded child with Down's
Syndrome. 9 Plaintiffs contended the doctors had never advised
them of the "[i]ncreased risk of Down's Syndrome in children
born to women over [thirty-five] years of age."60 Plaintiffs fur-
ther contended that the doctors had not advised them that an
amniocentesis test"1 could determine whether the fetus would be
born with Down's Syndrome. 62 The court held that but for the
doctors' failure to accurately inform the parents, the mother
would have been tested, and depending on the results, would
have terminated the pregnancy.6 3 In Park, Hetty Park bore a
baby afflicted with polycystic kidney disease" who died five
hours after birth. After the death of the baby, Hetty Park con-
sulted with her obstetricians to determine the likelihood of the
reoccurrence of the disease in a future fetus. 5 Allegedly, defend-
ant obstetricians had informed her that the disease was not he-
reditary, and that the "[c]hances of [her] conceiving a second
child with [the affliction was] 'practically nil'."6 Park became
pregnant and bore a second child with the same disease.6 This
child, however, survived for thirty months.6 The Parks alleged
57. Id.
58. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See also Comment,
supra note 4, at 615 n.50.
59. Park, 46 N.Y.2d at 405, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896. "'Down's Syn-
drome' is a syndrome of mental retardation associated with a variable constellation of
physical abnormalities caused by a chromosomal anomaly. (citation omitted)." Id. n. 1.
60. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
61. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897, n.2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
64. Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. "'Polycystic disease of the
kidneys is a condition characterized by numerous cysts [of varying sizes) scattered
throughout the kidneys, sometimes resulting in organs that tend to resemble grapelike
clusters of cysts."' Id. n.3 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
[Vol. 12:717
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that polycystic disease is an inherited condition and that, had
they been informed of its true risk of reoccurrence, they would
not have chosen to conceive a second time.69
The trial court denied recovery of damages for mental
anguish in both cases.70 The Court of Appeals affirmed as to
emotional damages, but granted recovery for sums expended for
the Becker child's long-term institutional care, and the Park
child's care and treatment until her death.71 The recoveries were
based on the doctor's breach of a duty to the prospective par-
ents. 2 Relying on Jacobs and Dumer, the court found that
"[c]alculation of damages necessary to make plaintiffs whole in
relation to the[ir] expenditures required nothing extraordi-
nary."73 However, calculating damages for emotional injuries re-
mained too speculative to permit recovery.74
The 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade75 prompted courts almost unanimously to recognize
wrongful birth actions, because of public policy recognizing a
woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.76 For
instance, in Berman v. Allan, twelve years after Gleitman v.
Cosgroves78 the New Jersey Supreme Court was again faced with
a wrongful birth claim. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had
failed to inform Mrs. Berman, who was thirty-five, of the
probability of a woman her age bearing a Down's Syndrome
child.7 9 They further alleged that defendants failed to advise her
of the availability of amniocentesis, 80 a procedure that would
69. Id.
70. Id. at 407-08, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98.
71. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
72. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. See infra notes 105 and 143 for a listing of these jurisdictions. But see James
Bopp, Jr., Barry A. Bostrom & Donald A. McKinney, The Rights and Wrongs of Wrong-
ful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27
DUQ. L. REv. 461 (1989) (demonstrating the opposite argument based on a Hohfeldian
analysis).
77. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
78. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J.1967).
79. Berman, 404 A.2d at 10; see supra note 59 for a description of Down's
Syndrome.
80. Id. See infra note 96 for explanation of this procedure.
1992]
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have disclosed the defect.81 Mrs. Berman asserted that she
would have submitted to the amniocentesis procedure and would
have aborted the fetus if she had been properly informed of the
risks."2
In recognizing the cause of action for wrongful birth, the
court distinguished Gleitman v. Cosgrove.83 The Gleitman court
had refused to recognize wrongful birth because the measure of
damages was too speculative, and substantial policy reasons pre-
cluded tort damages "for the denial of the opportunity to take
an embryonic life."' 84 The Gleitman court denied recovery for
medical and other expenses to raise, educate, and supervise the
child.8 5 Even though the costs stemmed from defendants' failure
to inform, the court believed plaintiffs could not retain the love
and joy of parenting while saddling defendants with the costs of
rearing the child.86
In contrast to Gleitman, the Berman court found that plac-
ing a monetary value on emotional suffering was not only possi-
ble, but was no more difficult than doing so for physical suffer-
ing.87 The Berman court held that the plaintiffs' claim for
emotional damages was the "appropriate measure of the harm
suffered by the parents deriving from Mrs. Berman's loss of her
81. Id.
82. Id. During the first trimester, the decision is not subject to state interference.
See supra note 6.
83. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). The Berman court observed that:
[i]n light of changes in the law which have occurred in the 12 years since
Gleitman was decided, the second ground relied upon by the Gleitman majority
can no longer stand in the way of judicial recognition of a cause of action founded
upon wrongful birth. The Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade... clearly es-
tablishes that a woman possesses a constitutional right to decide whether her fetus
should be aborted, at least during the first trimester of pregnancy. Public policy
now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition that sh not be imper-
missibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that decision.
Berman, 404 A.2d at 14.
84. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. See supra notes 23, 30-39 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 23, 30-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gleitman.
However, the Berman court disagreed and reasoned that "[a]ny other ruling would in
effect immunize from liability those in the medical field providing inadequate guidance
to persons who would choose to exercise their constitutional right to abort fetuses which,
if born, would suffer from genetic defects." Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
86. Berman, 404 A.2d 8, 14. The court held that such an award would "constitute a
windfall to the parents and place too unreasonable a financial burden upon physicians."
Id.
87. Id. at 14-15.
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/6
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right to abort the fetus." '
Surprisingly, two years later, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed its position as to damages in the wrongful birth
context in Schroeder v. Perkel.89 In that case, the physician's
failure to diagnose the genetic defect in their first child deprived
the parents of choosing whether or not to conceive a second
child who might have cystic fibrosis.90 Overruling Berman in
part, the court allowed recovery of medical expenses.91 Cautious
not to "confer a windfall" 92 on the parents, the court explained
its damage determination, stating that "Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder
[would] receive no compensating pleasure from incurring ex-
traordinary medical expenses on behalf of Thomas. There is no
joy in watching a child suffer and die from cystic fibrosis."93
Gleitman's influence9 in wrongful birth cases has dimin-
ished considerably during the past two decades.95 Three devel-
opments help explain the trend toward judicial acceptance of
wrongful birth claims. The first is the increased ability of health
care professionals to predict and detect the presence of fetal de-
fects. 6 The second is Roe v. Wade and its progeny. 97 In Roe, the
88. Id. at 14.
89. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
90. Cystic fibrosis is one of the most common fatal genetic diseases in the United
States and affects approximately one out of every 1800 babies. Id. See also Note, supra
note 1, at 1491, 1494.
91. Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 842.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 23 for a discussion of Gleitman.
95. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986). Abortions could not legally be obtained
in many states when Gleitman was decided. Today, as a result of Roe and scientific
advances, it is possible for prospective parents to learn of congenital defects in the fetus,
and, consequently, to decide to terminate the pregnancy. Accordingly, courts have recog-
nized that "physicians who perform testing and provide advice relevant to the constitu-
tionally guaranteed procreative choice, or whose actions could reasonably be said to give
rise to a duty to provide such testing or advice, have an obligation to adhere to reasona-
ble standards of professional performance." Id. at 346.
96. See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345-46. "Science's improved capacity to assess risk fac-
tors in pregnant women, as well as the development of 'sophisticated biochemical and
cytogenic tests for assaying amniotic fluid and maternal and fetal blood,' have greatly
enhanced the importance of reproductive counseling." Id. at 345 (quoting Capron, Tort
Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 618, 626 (1979)).
[A]mniocentesis, a procedure in which a physician removes, cultures, and tests
fetal cells that have been sloughed into the fluid surrounding the fetus in the am-
niotic sac, is a signal example of one such test. In the early 1970's, amniocentesis
11
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Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of privacy en-
compasses a woman's decision whether to abort.9 8 Finally, judi-
cial acceptance of wrongful birth is premised on the theory that
it is a logical and necessary extension of existing principles of
tort law.99 Refusal to recognize this cause of action would frus-
trate the fundamental policies of tort law: to compensate the
victim; to deter negligence; and to encourage due care.100
In summary, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
prompted courts to recognize wrongful birth actions because of a
was regarded as an experimental procedure; by the mid-1970's, it was commonly
accepted in medical practice.
Id. at 346 (quoting Rogers, Thomas DeWitt, HIl, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth:
Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. Rav 713,
720-721 (1982)).
97. See infra Part III.
98. See supra note 6 and accompanying text, Virtually every court has relied on Roe
as the most compelling rationale for recognizing wrongful birth claims. See, e.g., Smith,
513 A.2d at 346 ("[W]e believe that Roe is controlling;, we do not hold that our decision
would be the same in its absence.").
A few courts have also stated that refusal "to recognize wrongful birth claims
[wiould impermissibly burden the constitutional rights involved in conception, procrea-
tion, and other familial decisions." Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550
(D.S.C. 1981) (citations omitted).
"Notwithstanding the disparate views within society on the controversial practice of
abortion, we are bound by the law that protects a woman's right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy." Smith, supra, at 348.
As long as abortion remains an option allowed by law, the physician owes a duty
to furnish patients with adequate information for them to be able to decide
whether to choose that course of action. Those who would eliminate such a right
of recovery must first abolish the right to have an abortion ....
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Mich. 1987).
[P]ublic policy favoring birth over abortion to defeat plaintiff's cause of action
cannot succeed because it squarely conflicts with the plaintiff's constitutional
right as articulated in Roe v. Wade, .. . to seek a termination of pregnancy under
certain circumstances. Were the plaintiff merely free to seek the abortion but una-
ble to seek a remedy at law for injuries consequent upon the negligent perform-
ance of that abortion, the right would be hollow indeed.
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981).
99. Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
1985).
100. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law);
Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (ap-
plying Pennsylvania law); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (ap-
plying South Carolina law); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
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change in public policy.101 The Gleitman rationale lost validity
because, in the wrongful birth context, anti-abortion policy was
displaced by parents' constitutional right of privacy.10 2 Further-
more, the ability to detect birth defects in utero increased
greatly.10 3
Consequently, most courts abandoned their belief that dam-
ages for wrongful birth were not cognizable at law. Relying on
fundamental tort law, the courts concluded that doctors should
be required to make amends for losses proximately caused by
their negligent deprivation of a woman's right to decide whether
to bear a child."0
C. The Status of "Wrongful Birth" Today
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have recog-
nized the wrongful birth cause of action, 05 while four states
have rejected it.108 For instance, Schork v. Huber07 rejected the
wrongful birth cause of action. In that case, a doctor performed
a sterilization procedure on Sharon A. Schork, "[a]ssuring her
that [it was] ninety-nine percent effective in preventing preg-
nancy."108 Later that year, she delivered a healthy baby and
101. See infra notes 105 and 143 for a listing of these cases.
102. Rogers, supra note 26, at 754.
103. See generally Note, supra note 1.
104. See infra note 105 for a listing of these jurisdictions.
105. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama
law); Philipps v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (en banc); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en
banc); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Siemienic v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987);
Arche v. United States Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); Eisenbrenner v. Stan-
ley, 308 N.W. 2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986);
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davia, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash.
1983) (en banc); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); MP. Rav. STAT. ANN, tit. 24, § 2931(3)
(West 1990).
106. See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d
741 (Mo. 1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985); Spencer v. Siekel,
742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987).
107. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
108. Id. at 862.
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sued the doctor for negligence in the sterilization procedure. 109
Although the tort was not characterized as a wrongful birth
cause of action,"1 the court held that "[t]he establishment of a
cause of action based on the matter of wrongful conception,
wrongful life or wrongful birth is clearly within the purview of
the legislature only." '
A Missouri court had difficulty overcoming the obstacle of
proximate cause. 112 In Wilson v. Kuenzi113 Barbara Wilson's
baby was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome.1 14 The risk of
Down's is "[a]pproximately 1 in 1000 for women in their twen-
ties, and escalates to approximately 1 in 300 for a woman age
thirty-six."1 Such a defect can be detected by amniocentesis.1 '
Barbara Wilson, age 36 at the time of conception, alleged that
her doctor was negligent in not advising her of the availability of
amniocentesis.11 7 The court refused to recognize the cause of ac-
tion, because it believed that proximate cause could not be
proven, and because recognition of such a cause of action would
create "a kind of medical paternity suit."1
Assuming, arguendo, that proximate cause could be estab-
lished, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Azzolino v.
Dingfelder,119 reasoned that traditional tort analysis could pro-
ceed to the proximate cause step and no further: "In order to
allow recovery such courts must then take a step into entirely
untraditional analysis by holding the existence of a human life
can constitute an injury cognizable at law. 1 20 The plaintiffs did
not allege that the doctor had directly caused the genetic de-
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
111. Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 863.
112. Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988). See supra note 26 for a discus-
sion of proximate cause.
113. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 741.
114. Id. at 741-2. See supra note 59 for a definition of Down's Syndrome.
115. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 741.
116. Id. See supra note 96 for a discussion of amniocentesis.
117. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 741-42.
118. Id. at 744-45.
119. 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
120. Id. at 533-34. Reverting to the Gleitman rationale, the court found that this
step would require the court to find that life with severe defects amounts to a legal
injury. Id. at 534.
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fect.121 Thus, the court denied recovery because "the only dam-
ages the plaintiffs allege they have suffered arise, if at all, from
the failure of the [doctor] to take steps which would have led to
abortion of the already existing and defective fetus. 122 The
court was also concerned that "[a]s medical science advances the
capability to detect genetic imperfections in a fetus, physicians
in jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth will be forced to carry
an increasingly heavy burden in determining what information is
important to parents when attempting to obtain their informed
consent for the fetus carried to term. '123 This would be too bur-
densome on physicians. 24 The court illustrated its position by
this example:
A clinical instructor asks his students to advise an expectant
mother on the fate of a fetus whose father has chronic syphilis.
Early siblings were born with a collection of defects such as deaf-
ness, blindness, and retardation. The usual response of the stu-
dents is: "Abort!" The teacher then calmly replies: "Congratula-
tions, you have just aborted Beethoven." 25
The extent of the doctor's duty and corresponding liability
was a concern to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Spencer v.
Seikel.1 28 In Spencer, the parents were informed by their doctor
that the fetus had hydrocephalus, 27 which retards brain devel-
opment.1 28  The parents sued their physician under the
Oklahoma Informed Consent Law,129 alleging he had been negli-
gent in failing to disclose material information concerning abor-
tion as an available alternative.1 0 The doctor argued that
"[a]bortion was forbidden by statute in Oklahoma once the fetus
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 535.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth, 14 J. FAht L. 15, 38-39 (1980), (quoting, Feinman, Getting Along with
the Genetic Genie, LEGA ASPECTS OF MED. PRAc. Mar. 1979, at 38.).
126. 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987).
127. Id. at 1128. "Hydrocephalus [is] a condition [that] results from the backing up
of cerebrospinal fluid into the brain ventricles." Id.
128. Id. "The child was born with virtually no brain." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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was viable, unless the mother's life or health was in danger." '131
Thus, the doctor argued that "[h]e had no duty to disclose infor-
mation about an alternative treatment not legally available to
his patient."132 The court agreed with the doctor, yet expressly
refused to create a "'[c]ommon knowledge exception' to the re-
quirement for informed consent."1 33 The court believed that
plaintiffs had knowledge of the alternative at the time Mrs.
Spencer claimed such knowledge was "[c]ritical to her deci-
sion.' ' 134 Furthermore, plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved that
the doctor had failed to exercise the degree of skill or knowledge
required of him, because the doctor fully disclosed the
hydrocephalus and its effects.235
"Once a wrongful birth action is properly characterized as a
traditional tort action, the plaintiffs are entitled to compensa-
tion for all damages flowing from the defendant's negligent con-
duct. 1 36 However, some courts have struggled with evaluating
the consequences of a wrongful birth, and the corresponding
compensation. 13 7
D. Damages in Wrongful Birth Action
The primary purpose of tort law is to compensate plaintiffs
for injuries sustained due to the wrongful conduct of others. The
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1129. In fact, the court found it would be an unreasonable burden to
require doctors to inform patients of alternative treatments not available in Oklahoma,
but available in other states. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Comment, supra note 4, at 634. Contra, Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d
528, 533-34 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 131 (1986) (holding that "in order to
allow recovery [for wrongful birth] courts must ... take a step into entirely untraditional
analysis by holding that the existence of a human life can constitute an injury cognizable
at law").
137. See Comment, supra note 4, at 634. "[T]he question of damages has presented
a difficult and troublesome problem to the courts that have considered 'wrongful birth'
claims, with that difficulty engendering widely divergent approaches..." Phillips v. U.S.
508 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D.S.C. 1981). See also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that child-rearing costs should be recoverable); Smith v. Cote, 513
A.2d 341 (N.H.1986) (only extraordinary costs are recoverable); compare Berman v. Al-
lan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (emotional damages, but not medical costs, are recoverable)
with Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981) (overruling Berman in part and per-
mitting recovery of extraordinary medical expenses).
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normal measure of tort damages is the amount that compensates
the plaintiff for all damages proximately caused by the defend-
ant's negligence. 38
When a child is born with impairments, courts have gener-
ally allowed the plaintiff to recover expenses occasioned by the
impairments. 39 "[C]ourts have been at odds," 40 however, re-
garding recovery for the costs of raising the child beyond "those
occasioned by his or her defect. '141 Although such "[d]amages
appear to be properly compensable .. . [as] costs the parents
would have avoided but for the [physician's] negligence, several
arguments have been advanced [to the contrary]." 142 This sec-
tion discusses the problems that arise in calculating damages.
1. Economic Burden
The jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth are currently
unanimous in allowing damages for the parent's economic loss
due to the child's condition.1 43 These courts have rejected the
138. REsTAZTENT (SEcOND) OF ToRmS §901 et seq. The Restatement provides:
The rules for determining the measure of damages are based upon the purposes
for which actions of tort are maintainable. These purposes are:
(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms;
(b) to determine rights;
(c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and
(d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and lawful self-help.
Id. at §901. See also Berman, 404 A.2d 8 (holding that the doctor should be required to
make amends for damage he proximately caused); see also supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
139. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975).
140. See Comment, supra note 4, at 635.
141. Id.
Courts generally allow only the extraordinary expenses relating to the child's condi-
tion that must be borne by the parents. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
492, n.8 (Wash. 1983); see also Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
Some courts have also compensated the parents for their pain and suffering or
mental anguish. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
One court has allowed all expenses incident to the care of the child, without dis-
counting those expenses not directly related to the child's condition that would be neces-
sary for a normal child. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
142. See Comment, supra note 4, at 635.
143. These jurisdictions are: Robak, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama
law); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Tur-
pin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981);
17
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Gleitman v. Cosgrove'" rationale, which found calculation of
such damages impossible.'45
a. Mitigation of Damages
"On occasion, defendants in wrongful birth actions have
contended that the plaintiffs could have mitigated their damages
... by placing the [newborn] for adoption." 4  This argument is
based on the "'rule of avoidable consequences',"' 47 which "re-
quires a plaintiff to take any reasonable measures available to
minimize the financial consequences of a defendant's negligent
conduct."' 8 Whether it is reasonable to require the plaintiffs to
mitigate their damages by placing an impaired child for adop-
tion is a highly debated question. 149 As one court stated: "under
the principle that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him,
he cannot complain if the emotional and mental makeup of the
plaintiff parents is inconsistent with . .. placing the child for
adoption." s0
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); and Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
144. 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); see also supra notes 23, 30-39 and accompanying
text.
145. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693.
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the parents of
information by which they could elect to terminate the pregnancy likely to pro-
duce a child with a defective body, a policy which in effect requires that the defi-
cient embryo be carried to full gestation until the deficient child is born, and
which policy then denies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of treating and car-
ing for the defects of the child.
Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849.
"The contention of the defendant physicians takes too myopic a view of the respon-
sibilities of a physician treating a child with a genetically transferable disease such as
cystic fibrosis." Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 838.
146. Note, however, that a plaintiff's duty to mitigate only requires that "reasonable
measures be taken." Troppi v Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). It has
been held that requiring a parent to choose abortion or adoption is an unreasonable
measure. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 866-67 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
147. WILLIAM PROSSER, ToRTs § 65, at 422 (1971).
148. See Comment, supra note 4, at 636.
149. Id. See also Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
150. Id. at 637 (quoting Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d at 520).
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b. "Incidental Benefits" Rule
Some courts have offset the benefits of parenthood against
"the plaintiff parents' claimed losses in an attempt to accurately
assess damages ... consistent with the principles of tort law. '151
The "incidental benefits" rule of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in doing so has conferred a special
benefit to th interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable.15 2
This rule has been applied to cases in which parents of a
healthy but unplanned infant have sued for the costs of rearing
and educating the child.15 3 Yet, a markedly different trend has
developed in wrongful birth cases.1 "' Although parents of de-
formed children should also be allowed to seek damages they
have sustained because of the defendant's negligence - offset
by the numerous benefits that a child provides them - they
have been allowed to recover only those costs over and above the
costs of rearing a normal, healthy child.155 Both Jacobs and
Dumer limited the parents' recovery to expenses they had rea-
sonably and necessarily suffered and were likely to suffer in the
future - the additional medical, hospital, and supportive ex-
penses that would be required to rear a deformed child in con-
trast to a healthy child. 8' The New Jersey Supreme Court
151. See Comment, supra note 4, at 638.
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
153. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for discussion of such a cause of
action. See also, Comment, supra note 4, at 639. "To hold a physician responsible for the
costs of rearing a child whose birth he negligently caused, reduced by any benefits the
parents receive from the child places liability on the physician that is neither unreasona-
bly burdensome nor disproportionate to the culpability of his conduct." Id. See also Ri-
vera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); contra Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450
So.2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 1984) (holding that" 'a parent cannot be said to have been dam-
aged by the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child.' . . . [but] [t]here is no valid
policy argument against parents being recompensed for ... special upbringing costs asso-
ciated with a deformed child . ").
154. See Comment, supra note 4, at 640.
155. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975).
156. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 850; Dumer, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
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agreed in Berman v. Allan:
In essence, Mr. and Mrs. Berman desire to retain all the benefits
inhering in the birth of the child - i.e. the love and joy they will
experience as parents - while saddling defendants with the
enormous expenses attendant upon her rearing .... [W]e find
that such an award would be wholly disproportionate to the cul-
pability involved, and that allowance of such a recovery would
both constitute a windfall to the parents and place too unreasona-
ble a financial burden upon physicians. 157
2. Emotional Pain and Suffering
The "incidental benefits" rule was also applied when plain-
tiffs sought damages for emotional pain and suffering in Becker
v. Schwartz.158 The court held:
[P]arents of a deformed infant will suffer the anguish that only
parents can experience upon the birth of a child... afflicted with
an abnormality, and certainly dependent upon the extent of the
affliction, parents may yet experience a love that even an abnor-
mality cannot fully dampen. To assess damages for emotional
harm endured by the parents of such a child would, in all fair-
ness, require consideration of this factor in mitigation of the par-
ents' emotional injuries.1 59
Rejecting the "incidental benefits" rule, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in Schroeder v. Perkel,80 rationalized that the
parents receive "no joy in watching a child suffer and die from
cystic fibrosis." 6 ' The dissent in Schork v. Huber"8 2 also re-
jected the "incidental benefits" rule, explaining:
[I]t is likewise inappropriate to consider permitting the defendant
to set off potential emotional benefits. Who knows whether the
joys from rearing a child will outweigh the heartaches? We cannot
offset the well recognized, foreseeable expenses of child rearing
157. 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979). See also supra notes 83-88 for additional commen-
tary from Berman.
158. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
159. Id. at 414-15, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
160. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
161. Id. at 842. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Schroeder.
162. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
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with the joy we can only hope for. We cannot disregard the par-
ents' claim that they expect emotional distress from the disrup-
tion of their careful family planning, but allow the tortfeasor an
offset for the bundle of joy he hopes to have contributed to their
lives. Both the positive emotional benefit and the negative emo-
tional detriment of child rearing are too speculative and conjec-
tural, too subjective and personal, to fit within the parameters of
the subject of damages. 163
Some courts deny recovery of damages for emotional pain
and suffering because the "calculation of damages for plaintiffs'
emotional injuries remains too speculative to permit recovery
notwithstanding the breach of a duty flowing from defendants to
themselves. '16 4 Other courts hold that the monetary equivalent
of emotional distress is an "appropriate measure of the harm
suffered by the parents deriving from ... loss of [the mother's]
right to abort the fetus."165
Some courts measure recovery for emotional distress using
the "bystander rule," in which recovery for emotional distress is
awarded only if it is "engendered by a shock received" during
childbirth.66 Other courts believe that merely witnessing the
birth of an impaired child is sufficient. 67 Finally, some "courts
have refused to recognize the parents' cause of action for wrong-
ful birth on the theory that public policy prevents the birth of a
child from being viewed as an injury to its parents."168
E. Legislation
Various states have passed statutes recognizing or limiting
wrongful birth actions.16 9 These statutes preclude causes of ac-
163. Id. at 866 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
164. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
902 (1978).
165. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
166. Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
167. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 319 (Idaho 1984) (citing Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492 (Wash. 1983) (en banc)). Cf. Arche v. United States Dept. of
Army, 798 P.2d 477, 482 (Kan. 1990) (denying recovery to parents who witnessed the
birth of their deformed child because the child's injury occurs during the development of
the fetus, and, therefore, the parents are not aware of the injury at the time).
168. See Comment, supra note 4, at 627.
169. See generally IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990); IND. CODE § 34-1-1-11 (1986 & Supp.
1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424
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tion predicated upon the inability to obtain an abortion. The
language of the existing state statutes varies, 170 "but all of the
laws embody a form of the basic prohibition contained in model
legislation: [t]here shall be no cause of action on behalf of any
person based on the claim that but for an act or omission, a per-
son would not have been permitted to have been born alive but
would have been aborted. 17 1
The Minnesota, Indiana, and Missouri statutes prohibit
causes of action based on "negligent" conduct.1 72 South Dakota,
Idaho, and Pennsylvania statutes are broader, prohibiting ac-
tions based on intentional as well as negligent conduct.173 South
Dakota's law, for instance, prevents an award of damages based
on claims that, but for the "conduct of another," a person would
not have been born alive.1 74 Idaho's statute mirrors the model.17 5
The Pennsylvania wrongful birth statute proscribes actions
claiming that "but for an act or omission of a defendant, a per-
(West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8305 (1982 & Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (Rev. 1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1992).
170. See infra notes 172-77 for the text of these statutes.
171. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100
HARv. L. REv. 2017, 2019 (1987).
172. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989), provides: "Wrongful birth action pro-
hibited. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on
the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, [a child] would have been
aborted." Id. at §145.424 (2).
IND. CODE § 34-1-1-11 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1991), provides: "No person shall main-
tain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on [his behalf] based on the claim
that but for the negligent conduct of another [he] would have been aborted." Id.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1992), provides: "No person shall
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on the claim that but
for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted." Id.
173. See infra notes 174-77 for the text of these statutes. "South Dakota, Idaho and
Pennsylvania .... appear to prohibit actions based on intentional as well as negligent
actions because those statutes do not refer to degrees of wrongdoing." Romney, supra
note 5, at 358.
174. S.D. CoDiwmD LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (Rev. 1987), provides: "There shall be no
cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any person based on the claim that, but
for the conduct of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born
alive." Id.
175. IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990), provides: "A cause of action shall not arise, and
damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for
the act or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been
born alive but would have been aborted." Id. at 5-334(1).
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son once conceived would not or should not have been born. 1 "7
Maine's statute is not as severe, allowing recovery of limited
damages for costs associated with a child's impairment.1 7
In Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,17 s a Minnesota
case, the parents of a handicapped child sought to "[i]nvalidate
wrongful birth legislation on the ground that it interfere[d] with
the right to decide to abort as defined in Roe."17 9 Their efforts
failed.180 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld its state's
wrongful birth statute as constitutional,8 1 concluding that it did
not involve state action and therefore did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. 82 The court upheld the statute by deferring
176. 42 PA. STAT. CONs. ANN., § 8305 (1989 & Supp. 1991), provides: "Wrongful
birth. - There shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any person
based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once con-
ceived would not or should not have been born." Id.
177. MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1990), provides: "Birth of unhealthy
child; damages limited. Damages for the birth of an unhealthy child born as a result of
professional negligence shall be limited to damages associated with the disease, defect or
handicap suffered by the child." Id. at § 2931(3).
178. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
179. See Note, supra note 171, at 2017.
180. Id.; Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14.
181. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14.
Before addressing the Hickmans' constitutional challenges to subdivision 2, we
find it helpful to discuss the legal basis of the wrongful birth cause of action. At
common law, no cause of action existed for either wrongful birth or wrongful
death .... Like wrongful death, wrongful birth presents a myriad of public policy
problems, including difficulty in ascertaining damages, increased litigation, and
distinguishing between legislative and judicial roles . . . . Because of those
problems and the fact that no such action exists at common law, we consider the
establishment of wrongful birth or wrongful life suits to be best within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the legislature. In MINN. STAT. § 145.424, the legislature has
made its intent clear: no wrongful birth or wrongful life suits are to be permitted.
The legislature has now spoken on the subject and, barring constitutional viola-
tions, that should end that matter.
Id. at 13. Cf. C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988) (declining to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the Utah statute because plaintiffs' cause of action, a wrongful conception
cause of action, was incorrectly characterized as a wrongful birth action, and, therefore,
the statute was inapplicable).
182. Concluding that state action was not involved, the court stated:
First, we do not believe that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment apply to this case. Prerequisite to a possible violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment is state action or involvement .... How can it be
argued that state action is involved in this case? The relationship here is strictly
between doctor and patient. The statute does not forbid the doctor to inform the
patient of new tests and the risks they entail. It does not directly touch on the
expectant mother's right to choose an abortion. Due process does not require that
23
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to the legislature because the statute did not interfere with a
woman's constitutional right to an abortion.183
As evidenced by both the legislation discussed above and
the Hickman decision, the states have already found ways to
justify legislation prohibiting wrongful birth claims.184 These
states have relied on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions,8 5 including the most recent in Rust v. Sullivan. 6 The
next section and Appendix A discuss these decisions and address
the erosion of the constitutional right to an abortion and its del-
eterious effect on the future of the wrongful birth cause of
action.
III. United States Supreme Court's Influence on the Tort of
"Wrongful Birth": Decisions After Roe v. Wade
Since Roe v. Wadea 7 decisions have narrowed instead of
expanded a woman's right to an abortion.88 As will be discussed,
"public funding" is the ostensible rationale for a "chipping
away" at the abortion right. For instance, in Maher v. Roe,189
two indigent women challenged a Connecticut Welfare Depart-
ment regulation that limited Medicaid benefits for first trimes-
ter abortions to those that were "'medically necessary'. "190
Medicaid would pay for treatment related to childbirth, but not
for non-therapeutic abortions.19' The issue was whether the reg-
ulation "'impinge[d] upon a fundamental right explicitly or im-
the state adopt regulations prohibiting purely private conduct.
Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 13.
183. The court deferred to the legislature and reasoned:
Second, even if there were sufficient state action, the United States Supreme
Court has clearly held to the rule that, in order to be in violation of Roe v. Wade,
the state must directly affect or impose a significant burden on a woman's right to
an abortion (citations omitted) .... section 145.424, subdivision 2 does not directly
interfere with the woman's right to choose a safe abortion. The two parties, doctor
and patient, are still left free to make whatever decision they feel is appropriate.
Id. at 13-14.
184. See supra notes 172-77 for the texts of these statutes.
185. See infra Part III.
186. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
187. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
188. See Romney, supra note 5, at 354.
189. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
190. Id. at 466.
191. Id.
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plicitly protected by the Constitution.' "192 The Court contrasted
Roe, holding that the Connecticut regulation did not block her
path to an abortion. 193 In Roe, "[t]he Texas statute [had] im-
posed severe criminal sanctions . . . on physicians and other
medical personnel who performed abortions .... ,,194 The law
was a "stark example of impermissible interference with the
pregnant woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy."19 5 The
Connecticut regulation, on the other hand, did not interfere with
the woman's constitutional right to an abortion.19 Despite up-
holding the regulation, the Maher Court concluded that it was
not retreating from Roe, but was merely drawing a distinction
between direct state interference with a protected activity and
state encouragement of an alternative activity:
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvan-
tage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund child-
birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources
for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a
more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's deci-
sion, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that
was not already there. The indigence that may make it difficult
and in some cases, perhaps, impossible for some women to have
abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Con-
necticut regulation. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation
does not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in
Roe.1 97
On the same day, the Court confronted the identical issue in
Poelker v. Doe.198 In Poelker, an indigent woman was refused a
nontherapeutic abortion in a public hospital in St. Louis, Mis-
souri. " She challenged the constitutionality of the city policy,
which provided publicly financed hospitals with money for
childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions. 00 Upholding
192. Id. at 470 (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973)).
193. Id. at 474.
194. Id. at 472.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 474.
197. Id.
198. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 521.
19921
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the St. Louis policy, the court reemphasized its position in
Maher: "[W]e find no constitutional violation by the city of St.
Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed
hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding
services for nontherapeutic abortions." 201
Public funding has also justified the refusal of certain medi-
cally necessary abortions.0 2 In Harris v. McRae, °3 the Court
upheld the Hyde Amendment,204 which prohibited Medicaid
funds from reimbursing certain medically necessary abortions
except to protect the life of the mother.0 5 Despite the factual
differences in Maher and Poelker, the court maintained its prior
reasoning:
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability
to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access
to abortions, but rather of her indigence. Although Congress has
opted to subsidize medically necessary services generally, but not
certain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the
Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the
same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically
necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen
to subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded
that the Hyde Amendment impinges on the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of choice recognized in Wade.208
201. Id.
202. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 322. The Court noted that:
Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited - either by amendment to the
annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
or by joint resolution - the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified circum-
stances. This funding restriction is commonly known as the "Hyde Amendment,"
after its original congressional sponsor, Representative Hyde. The current version
of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for fiscal year 1980, provides: '[N]one of the
funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or
incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement
agency or public health service.' Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926.
Id. at 302.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 316-17.
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Thus, according to Maher, Poelker, and McRae, a state's deci-
sion to use public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over
abortion also withstands constitutional attack. In Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services,07 the Supreme Court upheld a Mis-
souri statute prohibiting public employees from performing or
assisting in the performance of abortions not necessary to pro-
tect the mother's life.208 Maher, Poelker, and McRae had estab-
lished that a state may refuse to fund abortions. Thus, the Court
believed that it would "strain logic to reach a contrary result for
the use of public facilities and employees.
20 9
These decisions illustrate the erosion of the fundamental
constitutional right to an abortion, as established in Roe. When
public funding, public facilities, or public employees are in-
volved, states may refuse to perform and/or to reimburse for
nontherapeutic and therapeutic abortions.21 0 Only one exception
remains - when the woman's life is in danger.2 11
Although discussion of "public funding" was exhaustive in
these abortion decisions, the Supreme Court had much more to
say.212 The Supreme Court picked up the discussion of public
funding and abortion in yet another context in the recent case of
Rust v. Sullivan.213 In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld the fed-
eral regulations2 14 interpreting Title X of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act,21 5 which provide federal funding for family planning
207. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
208. Id. at 3058.
209. Id. at 3052. "If the State may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds,' Maher,
(citation omitted), surely it may do so through the allocation of other public resources,
such as hospitals and medical staff." Id.
210. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (refusing to allow public funding for
certain therapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977) (refusing to allow public funding for non-therapeutic abortions); see also
supra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 6, 187-209 and accompanying text.
212. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
213. Id.
214. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1 - 59.10 (1988). The regulations were promulgated in 1988 by
the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services and codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1- 59.10 (1988).
215. "In 1970 Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300-300a-41 (1982), to provide low-income women with access to family planning ser-
vices." BRIEF FOR PETrTIONERS, NEW YORK, at 3, New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d
Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1392), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
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services.1 6 Section 1008 of Title X provides that "[n]one of the
funds appropriated under this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq.]
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning. '21 7
For seventeen years, the Secretary of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services "had consistently in-
terpreted this section to mean that Title X providers may not
perform abortions, but... must provide nondirective counseling
to pregnant patients.."218 Adopting a contrary position, the Sec-
retary, in 1988, enacted new regulations specifying that a Title
X project may not provide counseling on the use of abortion as a
method of family planning.2" Moreover, the regulations broadly
prohibit members of a Title X project from engaging in activi-
ties that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method
of family planning,"2 0 and require that Title X projects be or-
216. Id.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1991).
218. BRIEF FOR PsrrrioNEIs. NEW YORK, supra note 215, at 5.
219. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1988). Prohibition on counseling and referral for abortion
services; limitation of program services to family planning.
(a)(1) A Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion
as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of
family planning.
(2) Because Title X funds are intended only for family planning, once a client
served by a Title X project is diagnosed as pregnant, she must be referred for
appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available provid-
ers that promote the welfare of mother and unborn child. She must also be pro-
vided with information necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn
child until such time as the referral appointment is kept. In cases in which emer-
gency care is required, however, the Title X project shall be required only to refer
the client immediately to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services.
(3) A Title X project may not use prenatal, social service or emergency medical or
other referrals as an indirect means of encouraging or promoting abortion as a
method of family planning, such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of
health care providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of referral
providers health care providers whose principal business is the provision of abor-
tions, by excluding available providers who do not provide abortions, or by "steer-
ing" clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.
(4) Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as prohibiting the provision of in-
formation to a project client which is medically necessary to assess the risks and
benefits of different methods of contraception in the course of selecting a method;
provided, that the provision of this information does not include counseling with
respect to or otherwise promote abortion as a method of family planning.
Id.
220. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1988). Prohibition on activities that encourage, promote or
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/6
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ganized so they are "physically and financially separate""22  from
prohibited abortion activities. In essence, as stated by Peti-
tioner, the State of New York, family planning programs may no
longer whisper the word "abortion" to their patients:
Abortion - a legal alternative to an unwanted preg-
nancy - [cannot] be mentioned, even in response to a direct in-
quiry, [not even during] a conference between physician and pa-
tient, [regardless of whether] it is medically indicated for the
individual involved.222/
In response to Petitioner's argument that the regulations vi-
olate a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to
abort, the Court adhered to the position it had adopted in
Maher and had reaffirmed in Webster:
The Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activ-
ity merely because the activity is constitutionally protected and
may validly choose to fund childbirth over abortion .... (citation
omitted). Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advo-
cacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the gov-
ernment had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all. 23
Petitioner next argued that the regulations impermissibly
infringed on the doctor-patient relationship and deprived a Title
X client of information concerning abortion as a method of fam-
ily planning.224 Thus, the regulations arguably "violate[d] a wo-
man's Fifth Amendment right to medical self-determination and
[her right] to make informed medical decisions free of govern-
advocate abortion.
(a) A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning. This requirement prohibits actions to assist women to
obtain abortions or to increase the availability or accessibility of abortion for fam-
ily planning purposes.
Id.
221. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1988). Maintenance of program integrity.
A Title X project must be organized so that it is physically and financially sepa-
rate, as determined in accordance with the review established in this section, from
activities which are prohibited under section 1008 of the Act and & 59.8 and &
59.10 of these regulations from inclusion in the Title X program.
Id.
222. BRtEF FOR PETmoNEs, NEW YORK, supra note 215, at 5.
223. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-77 (1991).
224. Id. at 1772.
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ment-imposed harm. ' 225 The Court's response was that "a doc-
tor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, informa-
tion concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside
the context of the Title X project remains unfettered. '226 Al-
though it would be easier for a woman seeking an abortion to
receive information about abortion from a Title X project doc-
tor, "the Constitution does not require that the Government dis-
tort the scope of its mandated program in order to provide that
information. '27
By restricting a physician's speech in order to "'reduce the
incidence of abortion', ' '228 the Supreme Court presents the par-
ents of deformed children with a double obstacle in a successful
wrongful birth action.2 Parents will now be unable to establish
the requisite duty of the physician to inform.2 0 Thus, these par-
ents will never even reach the merits of their cause of action
based on the constitutional right to an abortion.
IV. Conclusion
The foundation of a wrongful birth action is the physician's
duty to inform and the woman's correlative constitutional right
to terminate her pregnancy. Rust v. Sullivan231 threatens the
existence of wrongful birth actions because states may relieve
doctors of their duty to inform, in the context of public funding.
This, in turn, renders the right to an abortion nugatory. States
may interpret public funding as the key to circumventing a wo-
man's constitutional right to an abortion, and as a signal to im-
plement policies to promote childbirth over abortion. If chal-
lenged, these policies will probably be upheld by the Supreme
225. Id. at 1777.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1785 (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (quot-
ing 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1990)).
229. See supra notes 24-26 for a discussion of wrongful birth. The parents must
establish that, had they been informed by their physician of the genetic defect, they
would have obtained an abortion. This would satisfy the requisite causal connection be-
tween the doctor's failure to inform and the plaintiff's damages. Now, however, the par-
ents are faced with the added obstacle that the physician's speech is restricted.
230. See supra notes 24-26 for a discussion of the requisite duty of the physician to
inform.
231. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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Court.
By restricting a physician's speech to further "reduce the
incidence of abortion, 232 the Supreme Court presents the par-
ents of deformed children with a double obstacle to overcome in
maintaining a successful wrongful birth action. These parents
will now be unable to establish the requisite duty of the physi-
cian to inform. Thus, these parents will never reach the merits
of the constitutional right to an abortion. These women, usually
indigent,233 will be forced to carry pregnancies full term without
being properly informed of the consequences. They will be de-
prived of their constitutional right to an abortion, their liberty
interest in medical self-determination, and will not have a cause
of action against the physician for failure to inform because he
will now be protected by the program's regulations.
The Supreme Court's reliance on public funding as its ra-
tionale for depriving indigent women of the medical information
necessary to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion is
wholly chimerical. Ultimately, public funds will subsidize the
normal rearing costs, as well as the extraordinary medical costs,
associated with an impaired child. Consequently, the parents
and the impaired children will suffer irreparably with the finan-
cial burden coming to rest on public funds..
In reality, as stated by Justice Blackmun: "It is crystal clear
that the aim of this [section] .. . is not simply to ensure that
[public] funds are not used to perform abortions, but 'to reduce
the incidence of abortion.' ,,234 If the Supreme Court's reasoning
was actually influenced by public funding, it would not uphold
these regulations because they not only prevent the use of public
funds for abortion but also deprive indigent women of the access
to medically essential information. These women, deprived of
this medical information, have nowhere to turn. Thus, the Su-
preme Court, in an attempt to reach its preordained result,
adopts a rationale that is callous, insensitive, disingenuous and
strains logic. 235
232. Id. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, J.J.)
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1990)).
233. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
234. Rust at 1785. (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, Stevens JJ.).
235. See generally Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
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ADDENDUM
There has been a great deal of controversy over the rule
banning abortion counseling that was upheld in Rust v. Sulli-
van 23 in May 1991.237 For example, in November 1991, the
House of Representatives sustained President Bush's veto of a
bill that would have lifted his ban of federally financed abortion
counseling.238 This rule banning abortion counseling has been
"dubbed [a] 'gag rule' by critics" 239 who say it shackles doctors
and prevents pregnant women from obtaining information perti-
nent to an abortion.
On March 20, 1992, just prior to the publication of this
Comment, the Department of Health and Human Services an-
nounced enforcement guidelines for the federal regulations 240
that govern Title X of the Public Health Service Act.24 1 The an-
nouncement stated "that doctors in Federally financed family
planning clinics may give limited advice on abortions, though
nurses and counselors may not. 2 42
At first blush, the announcement seemed promising. 24 3
However, "an official of the national organization that represents
Marshall & Stevens, JJ.).
236. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
237. As one commentator has observed: "The counseling rules have drawn opposi-
tion not only from advocates of abortion rights but from groups like the American Medi-
cal Association because they appeared to muzzle doctors when they were speaking pri-
vately to women about their options when they become pregnant." Philip J. Hilts, White
House Allows Some Advice at Public Clinics About Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992,
at Al, A10, col 1.
238. William J. Eaton, House Sustains Bush's Abortion Counseling Ban, LA
TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1991, at Al.
239. David G. Savage, Abortion Gag Rule Revised. Critics Say White House Trying
to Have it Both Ways, SAN FRANcIsco CHnONICLE, Mar. 21, 1992, at Al.
240. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1 - 59.10 (1991).
241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. (1991).
242. See Hilts, supra note 237, at Al.
The decision provides an exception in the so-called 'gag rule' that forbids the clin-
ics from giving women information on abortions. Under the guidelines, doctors
would be able to refer women to facilities that provide abortions. However, admin-
istration officials said the doctor's advice must be based on medicine and not on
social concerns.
Abortion Gag Rule Loosened, NEwSDAY, Mar. 21, 1992, at 7.
243. "The Health and Human Services Department issued [enforcement] guidelines
... in a letter to regional offices that seemed to make an important exception to the
counseling ban... Enforcement of the rule, which had been delayed by political and legal
fights, will take effect within 45 days." See Hilts, supra note 237, at Al, A10, col 1.
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90 percent of the clinics called [this] action a 'cynical attempt by
the administration to have it both ways'. 24 4  "Planned
Parenthood of America Foundation immediately denounced the
guidelines, saying that they actually solidified the gag policy in-
stead of relaxing it. ' 245 Yet, the Department of Health and
Human Services stated that the "doctors are ungagged." 24
Examination of the five page letter from the Department of
Health and Human Services discloses that there is nothing at all
clear about the guidance proffered.247 The only relevant parts of
this five page guidance letter state:
Speech about Abortion
Title X projects may not counsel, refer or steer clients to abor-
tion. The regulation does not, however, forbid Title X projects
from mentioning the word "abortion". In general, Title X staff
should state that abortion counseling and abortion referral are
not services provided by Title X projects. Title X staff will make
it clear that they can refer a client to the prenatal and social ser-
vices necessary to promote her own health and that of her unborn
child. Referrals may be made by Title X projects to full-service
health care providers that perform abortions, but not to providers
whose principal activity is providing abortion services.248
Physicians in Title X
The February 2, 1988, Title X regulation will be implemented in
accordance with the November 5, 1991, memorandum of the Pres-
ident and the November 19, 1991, memorandum of the Secretary
244. See Savage, supra note 239, at Al.
245. See Abortion Gag Rule Loosened, supra note 242, at 7.
246. Id.; see Hilts, supra note 237, at Al, A10, col 1.
247. Memorandum from William R. Archer III, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Pop-
ulation Affairs of the Department of Health and Human Services, to Regional Health
Administrators; Subject: Implementation of Title X Abortion Regulation, March 20,
1992. The first paragraph of the letter states:
This guidance on the Title X regulation is for use by Regional Office staff in im-
plementing the February 2, 1988, regulations construing the statutory prohibition
on abortion as a method of family planning in Title X projects, salient provisions
which are found at 42 CFR sections 59.7 through 59.10. This guidance supple-
ments the previous guidance provided by memorandum dated May 30, 1991, re-
garding implementation of the February,1988, regulation and is designed to clarify
certain operational questions which have arisen concerning the implementation
and scope of the regulation.
Id. at 1.
248. Id. at 3.
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to the Assistant Secretary for Health. The first numbered para-
graph in both the President's and the Secretary's memoranda
provides:
'Nothing in these regulations is to prevent a woman from
receiving complete medical information about her condition
from a physician.'
This statement is intended to apply to medical information
provided only by a physician directly to his or her patient,
in a clinic visit or a subsequent telephone conversation di-
rectly with the physician .24
One interpretation of this modification in the rule was that
"the Bush Administration was trying to straddle the issue by
loosening the restraints on abortion clinics while at the same
time assuring anti-abortion forces that it was still firmly in their
corner." 250 This interpretation was supported by the opinion of
White House officials themselves:
[We do not] want to represent the exception for doctors as a sig-
nificant change in the regulations, but merely as a clarification to
show that the Government is not interfering with the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, an issue that was the focus of much criticism
from medical groups and abortion-rights organizations. But [we]
do intend to step between women and other medical counselors
who want to talk about abortion.251
In sum, these guidelines that may have been intended to lift
the constraints on the doctor-patient relationship, have, in fact,
obscured the permissible scope of that relationship, because, in
reality, they are driven by political motivations that probably
will not be resolved until the Clinton Administration addresses
the issue.
Rachel Tranquillo Grobet
249. Id. at 4.
250. See Hilts, supra note 237, at Al. "[A] strategist with the National Abortion
Rights Action League, asserted that with today's move Mr. Bush was trying to appease
the anti-abortion side while making an empty gesture to the other side." Id. at A10, col
1.
251. Id.
t I dedicate this article to my husband, Herb.
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Appendix
PROPOSED "ALL STATES" STATUTE
Chapter 10. Public Health and Welfare Security Act.
Subchapter X. Claims Based Upon Wrongful Birth Of De-
formed Child Not Absolutely Prohibited.
§ 1. WRONGFUL BIRTH.
The provisions of this section shall not preclude causes of action
based on claims that, but for the wrongful act or omission of
another, tests or treatment would have been provided that
would have made possible the prevention, cure, or amelioration
of any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap in the child born
with birth and or genetic defects25 2 E X C E P T that:
- if a public employee in the capacity of physician or other-
wise, is responsible for the wrongful act or omission because of
public funding prohibitions against informed consent that would
implicate the promotion, referral, or counseling of abortion, no
cause of action may be maintained.
252. Modeled after Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (4) (West 1990), which
provides:
This section shall not preclude causes of action based on claims that, but for a
wrongful act or omission, maternal death or injury would not have occurred or
handicap, disease, defect or deficiency of an individual prior to birth would have
been prevented, cured or ameliorated in a manner that preserved the health and
life of the affected individual.
Id. at § 2931(4); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424, subd.(3) (West 1989), which
provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for inten-
tional or negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the
failure of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim that, but
for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided
or would have been provided properly which would have made possible the pre-
vention, cure, or amelioration of any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap; pro-
vided, however, that abortion shall not have been deemed to prevent, cure, or
ameliorate any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap. The failure or refusal of
any person to perform or have an abortion shall not be a defense in any action,
nor shall that failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages or in imposing
a penalty in any action.
Id. at § 145.424, subd.(3).
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COMMENTARY
The "wrongful birth" section of the "All States" statute, ap-
pears to be a violation of a woman's constitutional right to ter-
minate her pregnancy. It also appears to deprive her of her lib-
erty interest in medical self determination,253 which precludes a
subsequent cause of action for wrongful birth of a deformed
child.
However, Part I of this Commentary will discuss the ration-
ale of The United States Supreme Court that supports "All
States" legislation of Title X of the Health Law. Part II of this
Commentary will address Practice Pointers for the lawyer in ad-
vising clients deprived of their reproductive choice.
PART I - RATIONALE SUPPORTING "ALL STATES" LEGISLATION
It is well known that because Roe v. Wade established a wo-
man's constitutional right to an abortion, wrongful birth actions
predicated on the abortion decision have been actionable in "All
States." Thus, prohibiting wrongful birth actions because public
employees have been relieved of their duty to inform would
seem to be unconstitutional.
Prior to Rust v. Sullivan,2 5" an aggrieved plaintiff would
challenge this statute in preparation of a wrongful birth suit by
alleging that it violates constitutional privacy guarantees. "The
right of privacy . . . encompasses a woman's right to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy. '25 5 "[A] woman cannot ef-
fectively exercise [her right] unless the physician has fully in-
formed her of all of her options. "256 Her "ability to rely on the
physician's advice ... is critical" to her decision.2 57 "[She] seeks
253. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Mar-
shall & Stevens, JJ.).
254. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
255. BRIEF FOR PETIoNERs, NEw YORK, supra note 215, at 47 (quoting City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419 (1983) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
256. Id. (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 445). "By suppressing medically pertinent in-
formation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of
maternal health, the state places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X clients'
freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment rights." Rust, 111 S. CL.
at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.).
257. BRIEF FOR PETMONERS, RuST at 33, Rust v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 4401 (2d Cir.
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a physician's aid not only for medication or diagnosis, but also
for guidance, professional judgment, and vital emotional sup-
port. "28
Thus, censoring the speech of physicians will "irreparably
damage the trust and reliance necessary to the [physician-pa-
tient] relationship. [These indigent] women [may] mistakenly
interpret [the] silence about abortion to mean that it is not an
available option or... it is inappropriate for them."2 9 Plaintiff's
argument would conclude that although the fundamental right
protected by Roe v. Wade is still intact it ceases to be a right at
all, because it is now unenforceable in the context of public
funding.260
Notwithstanding these arguments, the legislators of this
state are confident that the constitutionality of "All States"
statute will be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, if
challenged, based on the same rationale that upheld the regula-
tions challenged in Rust v. Sullivan2"' earlier this year. The ra-
tionale of the United State Supreme Court is set forth in the
Model Annotations that follow.
ANNOTATIONS
1. RIGHT OF PRIVACY
"Public policy now supports, rather than militates against, the
proposition that [a woman shall] not be impermissibly denied a
meaningful opportunity to [the abortion] decision." Berman v.
1989) (No. 89-1391), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (holding that the interests of a woman seeking medical advice about
a pregnancy are best served "by allowling] the attending physician the room he needs to
make his best medical judgment."). Id. n.60. "[Flull vindication of the woman's funda-
mental right necessarily requires that her physician be given the room he needs to make
his best medical judgment." City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 427 (1983) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)). Regulations tending to
"'confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the
practice of his profession' cannot endure." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
258. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Ste-
vens, JJ.).
259. REPLY B=uF FOR PETmoNERS. NEW YORK, at 13, New York v. Sullivan, 889
F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989)(No. 89-1392), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
260. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Ste-
vens, JJ.).
261. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
19921
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Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
This section does not impermissibly burden a woman's Fifth
Amendment rights. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1777 (1991).
"[R]efusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves the
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the [state] had cho-
sen not to fund family-planning services at all." Rust, 111 S. Ct.
at 1776. (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 209 S.
Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980)).
"[Flinancial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability
to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of
choice are the product not of the governmental restrictions on ac-
cess to abortion, but rather of her indigence." Rust, 111 S.Ct. at
1778. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
2. INFORMED CONSENT
This section does not impermissibly burden the woman's liberty
interest in being free from unwarranted intrusion in the informed
consent dialogue with her physician necessary to medical self-de-
termination. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
"[A] doctor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive
information concerning abortion and abortion related services
outside the context of [public funding] remains unfettered." Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1777.
Nor does this section impermissibly burden the common law duty
to disclose material information in the doctor-patient context.
But cf. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (ap-
plying Alabama law); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544
(D.S.C. 1981); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (en
banc); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en
banc); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Moores v.
Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Siemienic v. Lu-
theran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (ll. 1987); Arch'e v. United
States Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); Eisenbrenner v.
Stanley, 308 N.W. 2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J.
1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); James G.
v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
2931(3) (West 1990) (all recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
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birth arising from a woman's allegation that she was precluded
from making an informed decision whether to abort because her
physician failed to adequately notify her during pregnancy that
her child might have birth defects).
This section does not violate "a woman's Fifth Amendment right
to medical self-determination and to make informed medical de-
cisions free of government-imposed harm." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at
1777.
It does not conflict with Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
"Critical to... decisions in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate
governmental intrusion into the patient/doctor dialogue was ...
that the laws in both cases required all doctors within their re-
spective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplat-
ing an abortion with a litany of information, regardless of whether
the patient sought the information or whether the doctor thought
the information necessary to the patient's decision." Rust, 111 S.
Ct. at 1777.
This section "[m]erely define[s] the scope of the services that a
[publicly funded] health care professional may provide in the
context of a specific limited program." BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT,
SULLIVAN, at 17, New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 89-1391, 89-1392), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559
(1990).
3. PUBLIC FUNDING
Although "under Roe the government may not prohibit a woman,
during the first trimester, from choosing to [abort], the govern-
ment is not obligated to provide the means to exercise [this]
right." BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT, SULLIVAN at 13-14 (citing Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3051-53 (1989); Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-18 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)).
"Webster, McRae, Poelker, and Maher establish that the govern-
ment need not finance abortions or provide public facilities and
personnel for their performance. [Therefore,] the government
need not finance the provision of information about abortion,
whether that information is provided in the form of counseling,
referral, or advocacy." BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT, SULLIVAN at 14.
[A] doctor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive,
1992]
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information concerning abortion and abortion related services
outside the context of public funding remains unfettered. Rust,
111 S. Ct. 'at 1777.
PART II. PRACTICE POINTERS FOR COUNSEL
It seems that a wrongful birth action will fail in the context
of publicly funded family-planning programs. Parents of de-
formed children cannot assert that, but for the failure of the
physician to inform them of the genetic defect or deformity,
they would have terminated the pregnancy. In the context of a
publicly funded family-planning program, physicians may be re-
lieved of their duty to inform if it will implicate the promotion,
referral, or counseling of abortion.
Prior to Roe,262 wrongful birth actions were unsuccessful for
a different reason.263 Eugenic abortion26 was illegal in most
states, and, therefore, the causal connection (ability to obtain a
legal abortion) between the physician's negligence (failure to in-
form) and the plaintiff's damages (the deformed child) could not
be established. Today, almost twenty years later, the causal con-
nection (legal abortion) is still somewhat intact because there
has not been an outright reversal of Roe. However, the wrongful
birth cause of action is again in danger because failure of the
physician to inform is not actionable in a publicly funded family
planning program.
Therefore, in counseling clients who have been deprived of
their reproductive choice and, as a result, have a genetically de-
fective or deformed child, it is imperative to determine the con-
text of the alleged negligence. Did the physician fail to inform
because the program was publicly funded with the limited scope
of pre-pregnancy family planning services, thereby precluding
the discussion of abortion regardless of the situation at hand? If
yes, the fact that the client was pregnant and that the physician
failed to inform her of a deformity in the child with the alterna-
tive of abortion will not be actionable because this information
would exceed the scope of the program.
262. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
263. See supra note 23 for a discussion of the seminal case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove.
264. See supra note 8 for a discussion of eugenic abortion.
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